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AERONAUTICAL LAW REVIEW-1936.*
GEORGE B. LOGANt
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The year 1936 has been chiefly remarkable in that there has
been no federal legislation of importance concerning aviation. It
might seem prejudiced to suggest that aviation has been fortunate
in that Congress gave it a breathing spell.
It should be noted, however, that this last year has seen the
first effort to break the straight-jacket imposed upon air lines by
the Air Mail Act of 1934, as amended in 1935.
You who were "fortunate" enough to hear my last year's review will recall that my remarks concerning this legislation were
just a trifle off the complimentary side. The chief objection was
to Section 15, which froze the schedules as of July 1, 1935, and
which provided that the "off-the-route" operations of an air mail
carrier might be enjoined and suspended upon complaint of the
Postmaster-General or any interested party, if these "off-the-route"
operations "tended to increase the cost of air mail transportation."
This Section 15 also provided that the Commission could, after
hearing, permit the institution and maintenance of additional service or schedules.
It should be noted that there was no provision in the law
requiring the consent of the Commission for any air mail carrier
to inaugurate service, even though it might be a competitive service
to ;an air mail contractor and even though it might be inaugurated
by another air mail contractor. The power of the Commission was
apparently limited to stopping, or authorizing services after they
had been inaugurated, and this power was, in addition, limited to
stopping or authorizing the services of air mail contractors.
It is quite evident from the Act that an independent company,
having no air mail contract, may inaugurate competitive services
to an air mail contractor at any time. This does not require the
consent of the Commission, nor does the Commission have power
to abate such competition. The Commission's power to abate is
limited only to the competition that is inaugurated by another air
mail contractor.
* Address delivered at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the National Association
of State Aviation Officials, Hartford, Connecticut, September 24, 1936.
t Legal Counsel, National Association of State Aviation Officials.
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It was in this status of the law that the Transcontinental and
Western Air decided to ask permission to send some of its planes
to San Francisco from Albuquerque.
As all of you know, Transcontinental and Western Air has
an air mail contract from Newark to Los Angeles, by way of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Columbus, St. Louis, Kansas City, Wichita,
and Albuquerque.
As all of you also know, United Air Lines has the air mail
contract from New York to San Francisco, by way of Cleveland,
Chicago, Omaha, Cheyenne, and Salt Lake City. United furnishes
transfer transportation to Los Angeles by connection with Western
Air Express at Salt Lake City.
The Transcontinental and Western Air decided to furnish
direct and through transportation to San Francisco by way of
Albuquerque. It accordingly filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, on August 30, 1935, an application for permission to
inaugurate this service, consisting of not more than two transcontinental round trips daily. The petition was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, although the petitioner suggested that
permission was not necessary and asked the Commission, first, to
pass on the question of jurisdiction.
The United Air Lines, on September 21, 1935, intervened with
the allegation that this competitive service would compete with its
service from New York to San Francisco and would also interfere
with its passenger revenue on the route between Seattle and San
Diego through San Francisco.
On October 14, 1935, the Postmaster-General intervened and
raised the point that, first, the Commission had no authority to
entertain the application and, second, that the cost of carrying the
mails between New York and San Francisco, and the cost of carrying the mails between San Diego and Seattle would be substantially
increased. The Postmaster-General also suggested that the American Airlines and the Western Air Express be given notice of the
proceedings so that they might intervene. Both of these companies
intervened.
The American Airlines, as you all know, operates the Southern
Transcontinental Line through Washington, Knoxville, Nashville,
Memphis, Dallas, Tucson and Phoenix to Los Angeles. The Western Air Express operates between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles.
All of the intervenors contended, in substance, that their passenger and express revenue would be decreased and the inevitable
result would be to increase the cost of carrying the mails.
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The question was first heard before the Commission on the
matter of jurisdiction. This argument was had on December 13,
1935, before Division No. 3 and the division held that the Commission should entertain and hear the application. The matter was
reargued on February 19, 1936, before the full Commission, and
the decision of Division No. 3 was affirmed and a petition for rehearing denied. The ,application then came before the examiners
on the merits of the application on" June 2, 1936, and continued
until June 11.
Evidence was introduced, first, as to the question of public
convenience and necessity, as specified by the latter half of Section 15 of the Air Mail Act, and second, on the question as to
whether or not these schedules, if inaugurated, would tend to increase the carrying of the mail.
The abstracts of the evidence and the briefs on the part of
T. W. A. have been filed, but not the opposing briefs.
Your general counsel was one of the witnesses summoned,
as Chairman of the St. Louis Air Board, to testify before the
Commission, and took the position, which was universally taken by
persons living along the center of the United States, that this schedule would give direct service to San Francisco, where no direct
service now exists. From St. Louis, we must either go to Chicago
and thence southwest to San Francisco, or we must go to Los
Angeles and thence north to San Francisco. The new service, even
eliminating the usual hazards of missing connections, which in itself would be an improvement, shortens the time to San Francisco
by approximately two hours.
The decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission on this
point will be of greaf significance. It will determine whether Congress has been successful in its attempt, intentional or otherwise,
to freeze the picture of air transportation in the United S'tates, or
whether, unwittingly or not, it has created in the Interstate Commerce Commission an instrumentality which has the power to, and
will, permit the inauguration of additional services and schedules.
The decision of the Commission on this point will be eagerly
awaited.
THE COPELAND SAFETY INVESTIGATION

While it does not come exactly under the head
it appears, nevertheless, worthwhile to mention the
ducted by the sub-committee of the Senate Committee
under Senator Copeland, engaging in investigating

of legislation,
hearings conon Commerce
safety in air
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transportation, largely as a result of the death of Senator Cutting
near Kirksville, Missouri. Many of our state aviation officials,
including our President, Fred B. Sheriff, Gill Robb Wilson, Fred
L. Smith, Floyd E. Evans, and your counsel, testified at these
hearings.
A great deal of diverse and divergent testimony was received.
Air accidents were attributed to everything from acts of God to
engine failures, including within this broad gap, lack of up-to-date
radio facilities, inaccurate and insufficient weather reports, insufficient number of Department of Commerce inspectors, inefficient
ground services, inadequate fostering of aircraft development, lack
of coordination among the government's departments, failure of
the government to encourage inventors, etc., etc. Testimony was
introduced concerning new and possible inventions tending towards
safety, including parachutes to bring down the ship cabin and
parachutes to bring down the entire ship. The testimony taken
covers two volumes and it is, of course, impossible to predict the
net result of this mass of testimony upon the minds of the senators
and further impossible to predict what legislation, if any, may be
suggested as a result of these hearings.
One thing upon which the witnesses did not seem to be in
dispute was that the air mail acts of 1934 and 1935 had imposed a
hardship upon the air carriers and a serious restriction upon their
future.
Col. Harold E. Hartney acted as technical aviation advisor
for the Commission and was largely responsible for the thoroughness of the investigation and for the breadth and scope of subjects
encompassed.
It is to be hoped that the Senate Committee will, as a result
of this investigation, evolve and propose helpful legislation, and
it is further hoped that Congress, in such an event, will follow the
recommendations. The disappointment to all aviation of the fruitlessness of the splendid work of the Aviation Commission and the
expenditure of $100,000.00 in its work, when the President disapproved of the most significant finding of his own Commission
and when Congress disapproved of the rest, is still rankling as a
sore spot.
STATE LEGISLATION

In the first place, few state legislatures met in the year 1936.
Most legislatures convene in the odd years. In the second place,
those legislatures which did meet in the year 1936 did nothing of
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moment to aid or hinder the aeronautical picture.
view of state legislation is over.

Hence, the re-

IMPORTANT DECISIONS

United States v. Northwestern Air Service, Inc.'-Our old
puzzling question as to when a vessel is not a vessel and when a
plane is not a plane was before the United States Court of Appeals
of the 9th Circuit on December 20, 1935, in the case of United
States v. Northwestern Air Service, Inc.
A Fairchild Seaplane had apparently been used in smuggling
or other illegal operations and the government brought suit to impose penalties for violations, not only of the tariff acts, but of
the Air Commerce Act. It seems, though, that before the government brought its suit to impose these penalties, the sea plane had
been removed from the water and placed in an airplane hangar of
the Northwestern Air Service for repairs.
When the government sought to impose its penalties, aggregating $2100.00, the Northwestern Air Service intervened for its
repair bill of $1268.00 claiming a maritime lien for these repairs.
The District Court held that this being a sea plane, admiralty law
applied and the maritime lien was good. In this, the District Court
followed the decision in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service,2 which
held that a sea plane while afloat on navigable waters, was a vessel.
The Court of Appeals, however, followed the decision in Crawford
Bros. No. 2,3 which held that a seaplane, while stored in a hangar
on dry land, is not a vessel. It consequently held that the maritime
lien would not apply and that the lien of the government for penalties was superior to the lien of the repair man.
In this holding, the court also followed the decision of United
States v. Batre,* decided by the same court of appeals in March,
1934, which held that a penalty imposed on an airplane making an
illegal flight into the United States from Mexico was superior to
the lien of a chattel mortgage. In this latter case, the court held
that to hold otherwise would permit a complete evasion of penalties
by the device of chattel mortgages.
Neither of these cases seemed to take into consideration the
common law lien which every repair man has on the personal
property, of which he has not surrendered possession, and which
in this latter case, at least, had greatly enhanced the value of the
1.
2.
3.
4.

80 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 9th, Dec. 20, 1935) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 292.
232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371, 18 A. L. R. 1324 (1921).
215 F. 269 (1914).
69 F. (2d) 673 (1934) ; 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 495.
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property on which the government was asserting its lien. It would
seem to the writer that where a damaged airplane is repaired and
its value enhanced by the repairer, innocent of the plane's misconduct and unaware of pending penalties, some consideration
should be given to the repair man by virtue of the fact that he has
made valuable the very thing on which the government asserts its
lien. As yet no such case has come to my knowledge.
Day v. Equitable Life Assurance Society 5-We have had
another life insurance decision which leaves the question of the
exact meaning of the words "engaged in aviation" and "aeronautic
expeditions" in perhaps just as much of a muddle as it was before.
This was a suit on a life insurance policy which promised to pay an
additional $5,000.00 if death was the result of an -accident, but
excluded a death caused by "engaging as a passenger or otherwise
in submarine or aeronautic expeditions."
Mr. Day was killed while a passenger on a sight-seeing trip with
a friend near Denver. He was a guest only, had no part in handling
the plane, and was not a fare-paying passenger.
The court first held that a simple flight such as this was not
an "aeronautic expedition," that "expedition" was an inapt word
if used to describe an ordinary airplane flight and portended something more important, or a journey for a definite purpose, and cited
definitions of the word "expedition" in various dictionaries as
proof that this sort of a flight was not ;an "expedition."
In its decision, the court followed the case of Gregory v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York 6 and Head v. New York Life
Insurance Co.,' also Gits v. New York Life Insurance Co.8

It

should be noted that in these three cases, while the insurance policy
used the word "engaged," it did not use the words "as a passenger
or otherwise." It should also be noted that where the words
"aeronautic operations" instead of "aeronautic expeditions" were
used in conjunction with the words "as a passenger or otherwise,"
the company was not held liable in Mayer v. New York Life Insurance Co.,9 and in Goldsmith v. New York Life Insurance Co.' 0
There are two state courts which have had before them the
exact language of this present policy, namely, "engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic expeditions." One case was
Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society," and the other was
5.

83 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 10th, Apr. 7, 1936) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 420.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

78 F. (2d) 522 (1935) : 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 626.
43 F. (2d) 517 (1930).
32 F. (2d) 7 (1929); cert. denIed 280 U. S. 564.
74 F. (2d) 118 (1934) ; 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 278.
69 F. (2d) 273 (1934) ; 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 504.
256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144 (1931) ; 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 135.
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Provident Trust v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.12 The New
York court held that it was not liable and the Pennsylvania court
held that it was liable.
In the present case, the decision was divided, two judges being
in favor of the policyholder and one in favor of the company.
Our recommendation as to the weight of authority in this case is
to consult your own lawyer, pay him a retainer fee in advance, and
then toss a coin.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Halcombl 8 -Another interesting insurance company case was decided last November by the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the same one which
wrote the admirable opinion onl ownership of air space hereafter
to be referred to.
In this case, the policy provided that the policyholder would
be protected in the event of accidental death resulting from an
airplane, provided he was a fare-paying passenger. Recovery
was forbidden if the death resulted from "participating in aeronautics," except as a fare-paying passenger. In this case, the
passenger was flying with the pilot who had a private license only
and was forbidden to carry passengers for hire-hence, the policyholder could not have been a fare-paying passenger.
The court held that the company was not liable, but it does
not seem to have discussed the question as to whether the passenger in this case was "participating in aeronautics."
It will be remembered that in the case of Gregory v. Mutual
Life Insurance Co. of New York, 14 the court held that a father
riding with his son as a guest was not "participating in aeronautics."
These two decisions seem to be distinctly and diametrically opposed
to each other, provided the question of "participation" was raised
in the Halcomb case, which does not appear clear.
Casteel v. American Airways, Inc.1 5-A new and novel case was
before the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and decided in December,
1935. This was a suit brought by the widow of one Casteel against
the American Airways for damages for breach of contract of
carriage, first, because the trip was not completed, and second,
because it was conducted in a negligent and careless manner.
It appears that Casteel was taken on as a passenger on American Airways at El Paso bound for Louisville, Kentucky. He was
afflicted with tuberculosis and was quite ill and was permitted to
travel in pajamas and a bath robe.
12.

316 Pa. 121, 172 A. 701 (1934).
79 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 9th, Nov. 4, 1935); 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 143.
14.* Supra, note 6.
15, 88 S. W. (2d) 976 (Dec. 20, 1935) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 288.

13.
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The carrier sold the tickets with full knowledge of Casteel's
condition. At Fort Worth, where a change of planes was necessary,
a physician examined Casteel and advised that he should not continue by plane. Both Casteel and his wife protested and both
insisted that they be permitted to go by plane. The company refused, took up the tickets and made a cash refund representing the
unused portion. The company took Mr. and Mrs. Casteel to a
first-class hotel -and bore all expenses, purchased the railway tickets
and furnished transportation to the station. The couple traveled
in the pullman drawing room and were required to change trains
only at Memphis. They arrived at Louisville 29 hours later than
they would have arrived by air. Casteel stayed in Louisville five
days and was then taken to his home 150 miles distant by automobile and died a week later of tuberculosis.
The court held that the defendant was clearly a common
carrier and in that respect cited Curtiss-Wright v. Glose,'6 and
Conklin v. Canadian-ColonialAirways, Inc.17 It was further held
that among other obligations of a common carrier, it was
bound to accept all persons who desired to become passengers,
but that this duty was subject to the duty owed to all of its passengers, and that this duty could not be lost sight of; that where a
passenger's condition was such as to cause danger to other passengers, it was the duty of the carrier to exclude him. If it became the duty of the company to remove him, this duty was in turn
hedged about with limitations requiring considerate treatment, etc.
The court held in this case that as to Mr. Casteel the carrier
was within its rights in refusing to continue the trip, but as to
Mrs. Casteel it appeared that she had elected to remain with her
husband and even if her discharge from the plane had not been
voluntarily accepted by her, no damages were shown and that the
court had properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
The original claims that the trip was intentionally rough and
that the pilots intentionally "bumped" the plane, seem to have been
lost somewhere in the opinion.
Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.' 8-An interesting case of last year was a suit which decided the question
as to whether or not instructions in flying were necessities for
which an infant could be held liable on his contract.
In 1929, Adamowski contracted for a course as a private pilot,
the course was completed, and for this he paid $300.00. In 1930,
16. 66 F. (2d) 710 (1983) ; 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 154.
17. 266 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935) ; 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 284.
18. Third District Court, Massachusetts (Feb., 1936); 7 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 291.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

lie contracted for a further course as a limited commercial pilot,
the course was completed, and for this he paid $1300.00. Later he
contracted for a course as a transport pilot and agreed to pay
$3200.00. At all times he was a minor. He withdrew from the
transport pilot-course in May, 1930, and attained his majority on
July 20, 1930, at which time he was informed that he owed a balance of $48.55 on account of the instruction received under the
third contract.
The Curtiss-Wright Co. sued him in 1931 and, on July 11,
1931, he disaffirmed his contract and filed a counter-suit or crossaction for the recovery of the $1600.00 paid, with interest from the
time paid. The evidence showed that the young man had worked
since he was sixteen, had apparently been self-supporting, and took
these flying courses as a means to learn a new trade and earn a
better living. Although he had completed both courses of private
pilot and limited commercial pilot, he was unable to pass the Department of Commerce examinations and had failed to qualify.
He had been unable to obtain any work in commercial flying as a
result of having taken the two courses.
The court held that these courses of instruction were not
necessities and consequently the minor was entitled to disaffirm
his contracts and that he had disaffirmed them within a reasonable
time and returned judgment in his favor against the CurtissWright Company for the full amount he had paid with interest.
This case is pending on appeal and it will be interesting to note
what the final decision is, inasmuch as the contracts of a minor for
education have, in several instances, been held to be necessities for
which a minor could be held liable. It may be that .his failure to
pass the examinations and hence his total failure to benefit himself
financially as a result of these courses had a lot to do with the
decision.
Parker v. Grangerl1 -Last fall, in reviewing aeronautical law,
I discussed with you the case of Parker v. Granger,20' which had
then been just decided by the Court of Appeals, second district of
California. The case has now been decided by the Supreme Court of
California. This is the case which involved a collision between
two Stinson planes being operated in the filming of a picture of a
parachute descent into the Pacific Ocean.
You will recall that Capt. Roscoe Turner was flying a Lockheed Vega from which the parachute jump was made, and that
it was being filmed by directors and photographers of the Fox
19.
20.

90 Cal. Dec. 475. 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935) ;7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 275, 283.
39 P. (2d) 833 (1934) ; 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 289.
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Film Company following in two Stinsons. The two Stinsons collided and eight persons were killed as the planes fell into the Pacific
Ocean. Eight suits were filed and they were all consolidated in
one action. The suits were filed against Granger & Co., Inc., which
company rented the planes to the Fox Film Company and provided the pilots.
The points raised in the lower court and in the court of appeals were that the rule of res ipsa loquitur applied in the case of
injured persons where there was no evidence as to the cause of the
accident. Another point raised was that the court should have permitted in evidence the air traffic rules of the Department of
Commerce.
The Supreme Court of California held that the res ipsa loquitur
rule did not apply in this case, because the planes each had
Alual controls and that at one of the controls in each plane was the
pilot and at the other was an assistant director of the Fox Film
Company and hence it was not shown that the defendant Granger,
Inc., through its agents, the pilots, were in exclusive control of the
planes at the time of the accident. In other words, inference was
left that the assistant directors might have been piloting the planes
at the time of the collision.
Of much more significance is the holding of the California
Supreme Court that under the Federal Constitution the air traffic
rules could not apply to intrastate flying in California; that this
was intrastate flying and the legislature of California had imposed
no air traffic rules and hence the air traffic rules of the Department
of Commerce were not applicable.
This is the first decision of a high court that the air traffic
r'ules, which are clearly intended by the Air Commerce Act to
apply to all types of flying, on the theory that it is necessary to
regulate all types of flying in order to protect interstate commerce,
do not, in fact, apply to intrastate flying.
If this holding is followed by other high state courts, it is
obvious that this Association and all others should bestir themselves
to see that air traffic rules are put into effect in each state by state
legislation. If the federal air traffic rules do not apply to intrastate
Ilying and there are' no state rules, then there is no means by which
miscellaneous flying may be controlled, and- we are all well aware
of the fact that miscellaneous flying in air miles is greater than all
interstate flying, and has heretofore been, and, unregulated, will
continue to be, the greatest source of air accidents.
Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc. 2 1-That the California court
21.

266 N. W. 253 (March 30, 1936) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAw 420.
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was right in holding that the res ipsa loquitur rule should not apply
where there was a possibility of more than one person being at
the controls is made more clear when we examine the case of
Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, decided in 1936.
In this case, one Budgett and his friend, Schmidt, both licensed
pilots, went to the airport near Sioux Falls, for the purpose of
buying a ship. The defendant company sent a pilot, Jack Hollister,
to demonstrate a Travel-Air open cockpit model. The plane had
two cockpits, the front one, designed for two passengers, and the
rear for one passenger, and the cockpits were equipped with dual
controls, hooked up. Hollister demonstrated the plane and was
in the rear cockpit and Budgett and Schmidt were in the front.
While flying over the airport, the plane, in some manner, got out
of control and crashed to the ground and both Budgett and Schmidt
were killed. At the trial, the plaintiff relied, first, on the fact fhat
the Department of Commerce rule was being violated by having
both controls hooked up, but the defendant contended that Budgett,
being a licensed pilot and familiar with the regulations, was negligent in riding in a plane with the controls hooked up, contrary to
the regulations.
The court held, first, that there was no evidence that this neg-.
ligence was the cause .of the injury, but more importantly ruled
that the res ipsa loquitur rule did not apply to this case, because
(here was no evidence that the plane was in the control of Hollister, the defendant's pilot. It was not more probable that the
ship was being flown by Hollister than by Budgett or Schmidt.
These two cases only follow out the general law that the rule
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless it is clearly shown that
the defendant is in charge of the instrumentality causing the injury.
Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles 22-We have frequently
discussed at our meetings the question as to whether or not a city, in
operating an airport, is engaged in a commercial enterprise or in the
performance of a governmental function and have also frequently
discussed the liability of the city in so operating an airport as controlled by the question as to whether it was or was not performing
a governmental function.
We have had some light thrown on this question by the decision
in the case of Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, decided by the
Supreme Court of California in November, 1935.
In this case an individual taxpayer brought a suit to restrain
the city of Los Angeles from operating a municipal airport, con22.

51 P. (2d)

1098 (Nov. 20, 1935) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 290.
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tending, first, that the rental which the city was to pay for the land,
over a long period of years, constituted an indebtedness in excess
of the charter authority of the city for the current year. The
court, of course, held as to this that only the current year's rental
should be considered an indebtedness in determining the aggregate
indebtedness of the city for the year. The second point urged by
Ihe taxpayer that the charter of the city of Los Angeles prohibited
(lie city from engaging in any "purely commercial or industrial
enterprise."
The court in this case held, first, that the state of California
had, by statute, authorized the acquisition and maintenance of airports by municipalities. Secondly, the court held that this was not
a purely commercial or industrial enterprise, but a "public enterprise."
In this decision, the court cited for approval the case of Hesse
v. Rath,23 which was an opinion of the Court of Appeals of New
York written by Mr. Justice Cardozo.
The California Court might also have cited the case of Wichita
v. Clapp24 and the case of Dysart v. St. Louis25 and several other

cases.
It must not be thought, however, that this decision is in an),
way an authority for the proposition that a city, when operating
an airport, is not just as liable as an individual. A city may, by
legislative enactment, and by public charter, be authorized to engage in activities which are beyond the scope of what we call
"governmental functions."
A city is clearly acting within its governmental function when
it maintains a police department, but it is not within its governmental function when it is maintaining an ice plant for the purpose
of selling ice to the poor. Both activities may be legal and both
activities may be proper spheres in which to spend public money,
but in the one case the city may not be liable for the negligence
of its policemen, but may be liable for the negligence of employees
of the ice plant.
20
We all recall the case of City of Mobile v. Lartigue,
in which
the city was held liable for damages resulting from the method
and manner in which it had constructed its municipal airport by
throwing water on to the plaintiff's land.
We still anticipate that a decision will some day be handed down
in which a city is held liable for defects in, or defects in the
management of, a municipal airport.
23.
24.
25.
26.

249 N. Y. 435, 164 N.
125 Ran. 100, 263 P.
321 Mo. 514, 11 S. W.
23 Ala. App. 479, 127

E. 342 (1928).
12 (1928).
(2d) 1045, 62 A. L. R. 762 (1928).
So. 257 (1930) ; 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 365.
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DeVotie v. Cam!ron 2 7 -An interesting case involving the application of air traffic rules of the Department of Commerce under
the provisions of the Air Commerce Act was before the Supreme
Court of Iowa in DeVotie v. Cameron, decided March 10, 1936.
One queer thing about this case is that the function of the defendants, Cameron, et al. was not shown. We assume that he was
one of the members of the State Fair Board.
On August 28, 1930, a state fair was being given and the
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service had, under contract, furnished three
airplanes for an exhibition. Two of the planes collided and one
fell to the ground, fatally injuring DeVotie. Mrs. DeVotie first
sued the Iowa State Fair Board as ,an entity and the Supreme
Court of Iowa held in that case,28 that the State Fair Board,
being a governmental body, could not be sued. This new suit was,
therefore, filed against Cameron, et al., who, we assume, were the
individual members of the Board.
The petition charges that the individual members had conspired to do illegal acts, namely, to violate the air traffic rules and
the state statutes of Iowa imposing air traffic rules. Among other
things, it was alleged that the flight took place at less than 500 feet,
at less than 1,000 feet over an open air assembly of persons, and
that acrobatics were indulged in at less than 2,000 feet over an
assembly of persons.
The court held that the air traffic rules were not binding on a
sovereign state in its sovereign capacity and that the conducting of
a state fair and giving of exhibitions was nothing more nor less
than the discharge of the state's sovereign political functions by an
agency selected by it for that purpose.
In this case the court followed the case of Morrison v. Fisher,29
which is identical with this case, inasmuch as it involved the death
of a spectator at the Wisconsin State Fair at Milwaukee many
years ago in an exhibition flight given by the famous old-time pilot,
Arch Hoxsey.
Hinman, et al., v. Pacific Air Transport and United Air Lines
Transport Co. 30-It seems as if we at last have a decision which
clearly and definitely settles the question of trespass in air space.
This is a decision in the case of Hinman, et al. v. Pacific Air Transport and United Air Lines Transport Co., decided July 20, 1936, by
the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in a case
which arose in the Southern District of California.
27.
28.
29.
30.

265 N. W. 637 (March 10, 1936) ; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 419.
249 N. W. 429.
160 Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475 (1915).
C. C. A. 9th, July 20, 1936.
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Other cases such as Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,31 Swetland v. Curtiss,3 2 and Thrasher v. Atlanta,33 left much to be desired

on the express proposition as to whether or not a land owner
actually owned unoccupied, unused and unenclosed air space above
his land. The American Law Institute, in restating the law of
trespass, held, over the protests of the members of the American
Bar Association Aeronautical Law Committee, to the explicit doctrine that the owner of the land did, in fact, own the air space and
that a flight through this air space was trespass, unless "privileged."
The American Law Institute then went to a great deal of trouble
to define the circumstances under which flight would be
"privileged."
Your legal counsel in 1930 took the position that there was no
such thing as ownership of unenclosed air space. Dr. Arnold G.
McNair of England, some three years later, in his book on air law,
also announced the doctrine that ownership of mere space was
abhorrent to the common law. Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr., when
chairman of the Aeronautical Law Committee, personally appeared
before the American Law Institute and argued that there could be
no such thing as ownership of air space.
In the case which arose in California, the plaintiffs, who owned
the property adjoining the airport in the City of Burbank, filed a
petition in which they alleged that they owned 72 2 acres of real
estate, "together with a stratum of air.space sub-adjacent to and
overlying said tract and extending upwards to such an altitude as
plaintiffs may expect now or hereafter to utilize, use or occupy."
Without limiting themselves as to upward limits, the plaintiffs
stated that they "may reasonably expect now to use and occupy said
air space to an altitude of not less than 150 feet."
The plaintiffs then went on to allege that airplanes were being
flown through this air space below the height of 150 feet, alleged
that the value of the use of this air space by the defendant companies was $1500.00 per month, and asked for $90,000.00 covering
sixty months.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the airplanes followed one of
two courses in landing and departing over their land, described the
courses and stated that repeated use would tend to create an easement and would tend to deprive them of their property in time.
They asked for an injunction and asked for the value of the user.
The court first considered the old ad coelum formula, which
I

31.
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269 Mass. 639, 170 N. E. 385 (1930) ; 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 367.
41 F. (2d) 929 (1930); 55 F. (2d) 201 (1931); 2 JOURNAL OF Ain

LAW 82.

33.

173 S. E. 817 (1934) ; 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 332.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

you have all heard me talk about and which has been construed to
mean that the owner of the land owns from the surface to the
zenith. And the court frankly said that if it could adopt this formula as being the law, it would simplify the solution of the case,
but said: "We reject that doctrine. We think it is not the law,
and that it never was the law." The court, however, then pointed
out that the plaintiffs did not claim an absolute and exclusive title
upward to the sky, but that they did claim a present and absolute
title to the space to such height as is or may become useful to their
enjoyment of the land and claimed title to at least 150 feet. In
solving this problem, the court said: "The first and foremost principle is that the very essence and origin of the legal right of property is dominion over it. Property must have been reclaimed from
the general mass of the earth and it must be capable by its nature
of exclusive possession. Without possession, no right in it can be
maintained."
The court then went on and said: "The owner of land owns
so much of the space above him as he uses, but only so long as he
uses it. All that lies beyond belongs to the world."
The court said, however, that if the facts should show that the
method of flying over the plaintiffs' land constituted an impairment of his full enjoyment of the land, they would be entitled to
relief in a proper case. It so happened in this case that the plaintiffs did not allege any damages to their land, but simply claimed
a damage to their air space.
The District Court of Southern California had previously dismissed the petition and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its
action.
It is interesting to note :also, before we leave this case, that the
court held that it is not legally possible to obtain an easement by
prescription through air space. The court did not elaborate on this
feature of the case, but it is evident, of course, that if the land
owner does not own the air space, the use of it is not adverse, and
no rights may be obtained by use, no matter how long. or continuous
or definite.
It is to be hoped that this decision, clarifying the situation with
respect to air space, will remain final and be universally accepted.
The tendency of all decisions has been in this direction. This
leaves the land owner fully protected. Whenever flying is so conducted as to harm him, it may be enjoined. When it does not harm
him, it should not be enjoined. In any event, it leaves the land
owner free, at any time in the future, to improve his property in a
proper manner to any height he sees fit, and the fact that airplanes have traveled over it in a given line for years and years does
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not mitigate against this right, nor create any rights in favor of the
airplanes.
It would seem that those advocates who have insisted that the
land owner owns the air space have been short-sighted in this regard. If air space is owned, the air companies might, by flying
through it constantly on the same line and at the same height,
acquire a prescribed right, which some day in the distant future
would prevent the land owner from building at that particular spot.
The doctrine of non-ownership of air space gives him better protection in the long run than the doctrine of ownership.
City of Iowa City v. Tucker 3'-Another case involving the
allegedly conflicting rights of adjoining land owners and the rights
of airports and the users of airports, was the case of Iowa City and
United Air Lines v. Tucker, decided by the District Court of Iowa
in Johnson County, Iowa, on September 14, last.
In this case, the adjoining land owner, Mr. Tucker, objecting
to the flight of aircraft, had planted trees ;and erected poles along
the boundary line of his property, which seriously interfered with
the use of the airport.
The court held that every land owner was entitled to the
"proper" use and enjoyment of his land, but that trees and poles
along the boundary line which would attain a heighth of over 25
feet would not constitute proper use and enjoyment of his land and
the defendant was, therefore, enjoined against the permitting or
planting or erecting of such poles and trees. This case, if appealed
from, as to which I am not informed, has not yet been decided by
a higher court.
The year, in summary, has settled the question of air trespass.
It has not settled the correct and final definition of "participating
in aviation" and not finally the meaning of aeronautic expedition.
Some clarifying of the rules of res ipsa has been had, and some
clarifying of the status of amphibians as vessels.
The serious blow that has been dealt is the California decision
that the United States air traffic rules do not apply to intrastate
Ilying. This will ham-string the Department of Commerce in those
states where there are no state rules, or where there are state rules
but no machinery for or enthusiasm for state enforcement.
I cannot help but feel that the Federal Courts will take a different view. My recommendation to the enforcement division of
the Bureau of Aeronautics would be to make a test case and take il
to the U. S. Supreme Court before too many of the state courts
follow the lead of California and build up a formidable body of
case law.
34. Johnson County District Court of Iowa (Sept
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